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  • regime presidencial
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  • chefe de Estado
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  • coligação política
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  • governo
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  • poder executivo
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  • regime parlamentar
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  •  Bucur, Cristina
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  •  Presidents and cabin...
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    Presidents and cabinet payoffs in coalition governments / Cristina Bucur
     
    AUTOR(ES): 
    Bucur, Cristina
    IN: 
    Political studies review . ISSN1478-9299 . London : Political Studies Association : Blackwell, Vol. 18, no 1 (Feb. 2020) , p. 30-52
    RESUMO: 
    As a key consequence of government formation negotiations among executive and legislative actors, portfolio allocation offers a window to understand the impact of constitutional design and presidential prerogatives on cabinet dynamics across democratic regime types. This article uses Shugart and Carey’s emphasis on the implications of regime distinctions and institutional variation in presidential powers for executive-legislative relations as a starting point for an examination of the extent to which presidents influence government formation outcomes in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Many presidents in these political systems have some influence on government formation, which enables them to shape cabinet composition. Yet, whether these powers advantage presidential parties in reaping more cabinet spoils than their proportional share has yet to be investigated. Using data on 442 government formation situations in 23 European parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies during 1945-2015, this study finds that parties of strong presidents generally, or presidents formally empowered to choose a formateur, are more likely to be advantaged in the allocation of cabinet seats than their peers who are not allied with the head of state. [Do autor]
    ASSUNTOS: 
    regime presidencial; chefe de Estado; coligação política; governo; poder executivo; regime parlamentar
    AREA: 
    04.06 QUADRO POLÍTICO
    COTA: 
    RE-341
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